French government policy

French government policy in West Africa from 1945 until 1960 aimed to keep the colonies individually under French domination and to prevent them uniting into a strong federation that might challenge French control. In practice therefore, French policy tended to favour 'territorialism' - the fostering of narrow regionalist nationalisms within each colony, and encouraging close contact between each particular colony and France rather than a bloc of colonies and France. If necessary the French would even create a balkanized political unit to help maintain French domination. For example, in 1947 the French detached Upper Volta from the Ivory Coast, with which it had been administered since 1932. Paris wished to detach Upper Volta in this way in order to weaken the RDA's power base in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. The French deliberately encouraged the ethnic nationalism of the Mossi people of Upper Volta led by their hereditary ruler, the Moro Naba.

RDA leader Houphouët-Boigny addressing the nation

The RDA, led by Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, mended its fences with the French government in 1950-1- In return for Houphouet severing his links with the French Communist Party, the administration came round to official support of the RDA in its programme of radical colonial reform. Houphouet in 1956 was the dominant figure in French West Africa - a position he had achieved as a result of his leadership of the RDA, the economic boom in the Ivory Coast in the 1950s caused by rises in coffee production and prices and massive French industrial investment, and by his new political affiliations and his position as a minister in the Cabinet.

Houphouët-Boigny shaking hands with some Ivoriens at Yamossoukro

In 1956 the French and Houphouet introduced the Loi Cadre, a major step in the political development of French West Africa but also in its balkanization. The Loi Cadre set up elected territorial assemblies in each colony. The Federal Council in Dakar was limited to advisory functions. From the French point of view, these political reforms were designed to prevent the demand for independence spreading from the Maghrib states to West Africa, since the eight small colonies would, it was believed, individually be economically too weak and dependent on France in order to make-a success of independence. Thus the French supported balkanization as a method of maintaining colonial rule. Houphouet also supported balkanization because he was determined that the new wealth of the Ivory Coast should not be used to subsidize poorer colonies.

Senghor of Senegal, leader of the BDS (Bloc Democratique Senegalais), desired a strong West African federation linked with France, though developing along African rather than European lines.

He said that 'within the framework of a French federal republic, a French West Africa of twenty million inhabitants can, side by side with the metropolis, form a stable element and develop its own personality'. Senghor also accused Houphouet 'of being the instrument of France in balkanizing Africa'. In the battle between Senghor (federalism) and Houphouet (territorialism) it was the latter, backed by France, who won, and destroyed the early chances of unity in French West Africa.

When General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France in May 1958 he was determined to restructure his nation. He was going to create a new republic, and he asked all Frenchmen, and all subjects of France in the colonies, to vote 'Yes' or 'No' in a massive referendum. De Gaulle visited the colonies, offering them the choice of pulling out altogether from the French embrace, or joining with France in the creation of a new French Community. France's subjects in the West Indies and in Africa, excluding Algeria, were going to be offered independence if they wanted it as an alternative to the French Community- But if they chose independence, de Gaulle made it quite clear that it would have to be total independence - the severance of every tie with France, political, financial, economic and educational.

The terms were somewhat forbidding for French-speaking Africans. Did they dare to declare such a total severance of ties? Would they be able to stand on their own feet in view of the integration with France which had taken place in their economies? Would the educational system be able to support itself if French teachers departed? Would their welfare services, then subsidized, be able to withstand the withdrawal of French support? Would their products, accorded easy and protected access in France, be able to get adequate alternative markets? Would their nations be viable at all? How many French colonies would dare vote in favour of independence?

In 1958 Ghana was still the only black country south of the Sahara to have won independence from either Britain or France. Nkrumah needed companions in the great movement for Africa's liberation. Nkrumah sent out feelers to French-speaking West African political leaders, offering certain kinds of support to help the cause of voting in favour of independence.

Kwame Nkrumah with West African leaders including Sekou Toure of Guinea Conakry

Nkrumah's contacts differed from one country to another. In Niger, for example, he seems to have sought the support of Djibo Bakary, a Marxist-oriented politician and journalist and one of the main organizers of the communist-oriented trade union movement. Earlier in 1958 Djibo was already among the most vociferous and militant advocates both of a new French West African federation and of immediate independence from France.

Leopold Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny and YOULOU, all the new presidents of Senegal, Ivory Coast and Congo Braziville at the conference of the African Table held in Abidjan October 24, 1960.

When the referendum came he announced that he would campaign for an anti-imperial vote. He seems to have reached this decision even before Sekou Toure of Guinea reached a similar decision. How implicated was Nkrumah in Djibo's campaigning? In the words of Virginia Thompson, a specialist on French-speaking Africa: 'Unverified rumours circulated in Niamey to the effect that Djibo had received financial support from Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who was eager at this time to encourage all elements seeking independence from France.''

Tom Mboya shakes hand with Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the president of Ghana in Accra after he was elected Chairman of the All African Congress. Looking on with his trademark bladed head is minister Komla Agbeli Gbedemah (Afro Gbede).

 

But everywhere, except in Guinea, Nkrumah came to be disappointed in that momentous referendum of September 1958. Colony after colony voted in favour of retaining the imperial link with France. However, in Niger itself the voting in favour of the French Community was by no means overwhelming. The poll was relatively low (35-40 per cent), and there was a significant percentage (22 per cent) of negative votes.

 

But Sekou Toure in Guinea rose to the occasion. He believed independent states could create the federation most of them desired. He managed to mobilize the masses of Guinean electors to vote in favour of independence (95 per cent).

 

Sekou Toure said, 'We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery." One African country in the French- speaking zone had stood up to General de Gaulle and rejected continued political dependence on France. Yet the Guinean leaders did not anticipate that a vote for independence was a vote for total severance, because they did not believe that France would actually cut off its links with Guinea.

Sekou Toure said before the Referendum, 'I shall say "No" to the constitution but "Yes" to France.' Toure also said to a British journalist, on the subject of a total French withdrawal, 'How can ii mother abandon her. children? 'But Guinea was made to pay heavily for her 'No' vote. French facilities, French personnel, French equipment, were pulled out of Guinea lock, stock and barrel. It is reported that even telephones were pulled out of the walls and taken away to France. De Gaulle left Guinea in the manner he had threatened.