Early in January 1966 rumours circulated in regimental officers' messes and barracks that the army would be called upon by the NNA elements in the Federal Government to suppress UPGA-inspired political violence in the Western Region and establish Akintola’s NNDP government in fact as well as in name. When on 14 January the Sardauna and Akintola met in Kaduna it was rumoured that they were plotting to make arrangements to order the army to move into the West on 17 January. The assassination of key figures, who were alleged to be involved or would have become involved in this alleged plot, has made it impossible to discover whether or not there was such a plot. But whatever the truth, the rumours seem to have triggered off a pre-emptive coup by pro UPGA southern junior officers.

On 15 January bands of soldiers led by a group of young officers, working to a hastily revised pre-arranged plan, went into action simultaneously in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna. In Lagos troops under Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna (an international athlete who won the high jump in the 1954 Commonwealth Games) arrested Balewa, the federal Prime Minister, and Okotie-Eboh, the federal Finance Minister. Ifeajuna personally shot dead Brigadier Maimalari and Lt-Colonel Largema and later Okotie-Eboh and Balewa were also shot dead. Lt-Colonel Unegbe, the Quartermaster-General at army headquarters, was killed when he refused to hand over the keys of the armoury. Ifeajuna failed, however, to arrest the army commander, Major-General Ironsi, who rallied loyal troops and police.

Figure 99: MAJOR CHUKWUMA NZEOGWU, senior instructor at the Nigerian Military Training College, led an attack on the Sardauna's lodge.

In Enugu, the capital of the East, the northern officer in command misunderstood an 'order' from the coup-makers to arrest the Eastern Region ministers; instead he threw protective cordons round their houses. Ifeajuna rushed from Lagos to Enugu to take command, but he was forestalled by Ironsi's envoy Major David Ejoor.

In Ibadan, the capital of the West, the coup was led by Captain Nwobosi. Chief Akintola was shot dead after he put up spirited resistance with an automatic rifle. In Kaduna, the northern capital, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, senior instructor at the Nigerian Military Training College, led an attack on the Sardauna's lodge.

Figure 100: CHIEF AKINTOLA was shot dead after he put up spirited resistance with an automatic rifle.

The Sardauna was killed after a gun battle, with one of his wives and several members of his security guard and personal staff. Nzeogwu’s men then found and killed Brigadier Ademulegun and Colonel Shodeinde, and captured the radio station. Nzeogwu set up a Revolutionary Council and went on Radio Kaduna just after noon on Saturday, 15 January, to declare;

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united and prosperous nation free from corruption and internal strife. Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as Ministers and VIPs of waste; the tribalists; the nepotists.
But Nzeogwu was unable to consolidate the coup. Ironsi led a swift successful counter- revolution by surviving senior officers; Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna were re-taken for the government; Lt-Colonel Ojukwu in Kano seized the airport for Ironsi not for the coup; the coup majors were arrested and detained; the coup was reduced to the status of a mutiny by army dissidents.

On 17 January the rump of the federal Cabinet was handed over to General Ironsi, as President Azikiwe was on convalescent leave in Britain and Prime Minister Balewa was missing. A Supreme Military Council was set up with Ironsi as Chairman.

Did the young majors overthrow a conservative, northern-dominated regime in the interests of a new concept of "One Nigeria'? Did national and ideological objectives dominate over regional and factional aims? Or was the coup an Ibo coup? It seems at first glance the coup was an Ibo affair. Majors Ifeajuna, Anuforo, Okafor (all active in Lagos on 15 January) and Nzeogwu, and Captain Nwobosi, were all Ibos, and Ibo politicians were not killed.

On the other hand, the plotters had originally planned to kill all regional premiers, including the Ibos Okpara in the East and Osadebay in the Mid-West; but Okpara was saved because of confusion in Enugu; and Ifeajuna ignored instructions not to kill Balewa.

But Ifeajuna did have Unegbe, an Ibo, killed, and he himself was later executed by the Biafrans for opposing Ojukwu and secession. Nzeogwu was not a heartland Ibo; he had been born in the Mid-West, had made the North his home, spoke fluent Hausa, made all his closest friends among northerners, and saw himself as a national Nigerian patriot. Moreover, some Yoruba officers were involved in the coup;

Major Adewale-Ademoyega played an important role as co-conspirator with Nzeogwu. It should also be remembered that it was an Ibo, Ironsi, who led the counter-coup.

But if the coup was not an Ibo affair, neither was it an all-Nigerian affair: the North was not represented among the officer-conspirators, only among the rank-and-file who blindly carried out the conspirators’ orders. It would seem to be valid to interpret the January coup as a southern affair, as an attempt by southern officers to overthrow northern political domination, through the barrel of the gun instead of the ballot box. To sum up, the January coup was both a reform coup and an exercise in power rivalry.