The armed struggle for the independence in Namibia, which began in August 1966, could not achieve its main objective until 1990. Unlike many African states that achieved independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Namibia was the second last country to be decolonised in Africa. The progress of the success of the struggle for independence was hindered by a number of internal and external factors, some of which are explained below.

The introduction of the oppressive apartheid laws in Namibia in 1966 hindered progress of the decolonisation of the territory. The apartheid laws divided Namibia into Bantustans (Black homelands) along regional and tribal lines, preventing the rise of national consciousness. Oppressive laws like Population Registration Act, pass laws, Immorality Act, Industrial Conciliation Act, Separate Amenities Act and the Group Areas Act, were introduced. They impoverished blacks, denied them fundamental human rights, banned black political parties and criminalized the demand for freedom and independence. With such laws in place, the struggle for independence became painfully long, hence delayed independence.

The existence and long survival of the triumvirate of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Hendrik Verwoed, the Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966, concluded a political and military understanding with Portugal under Don Salazar and Southern Rhodesia under the racist regime of rebel lan Smith. Through this arrangement, South Africa drew support from Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to extinguish internal rebellion in Namibia. SWAPO therefore, fought a combination of three countries making it difficult to win early independence.

Tribalism and ethnic cleavage in Namibia delayed independence until 199O. In order to prolong her stay in Namibia, South Africa adopted the British policy of divide and rule, in which she played one tribe against another. She incited the Nama against the Herero on one hand and the minority tribes against the Ovambo, who composed over half of Namibia's population, on the other. The liberation movements too were founded on tribal lines, as SWAPO was initially predominantly Ovambo, while SWANU was mainly Herero. This disunited the people of Namibia and instead of fighting their common enemy- South Africa, SWAPO and SWANU were locked up in a power contest even before independence came. South Africa exploited this weakness to prolong her occupation of Namibia, leading to delayed independence.

The military superiority of the apartheid regime in South Africa proved strong for the people of Namibia to overcome, further delaying independence. In the 1960s, South Africa was the regional super power with a strong economy and military. Between 1960 and 1964, South Africa's military budget was raised from. 63milHon dollars to 375 million dollars. By 1960, she had a well-trained and equipped army of 50,000 troops and she owned nuclear weapons by 1979. On top of manufacturing her own weapons, South Africa received arms, military and technical advice from America and Israel. In contrast, SWAPO had a few half-trained and ill-equipped freedom fighters and depended on unreliable supplies from the communist world. This contrast in military status between South Africa and SWAPO explains the delay of Namibia's independence.

The efficient and highly skilled spy system of South Africa was yet another hurdle that delayed Namibia's independence. The South African force of 5,000 well-trained and equipped spies was reinforced by 100,000 white settlers in Namibia who spied the military and political activities of SWAPO in the black homelands. Blacks were also wooed by economic gains to spy and provide information. The South African military used such information to successfully develop counter-strategies against SWAPO, making independence to come late.

South Africa's strong; economic and strategic interest in Namibia further delayed independence. Though her land is dry and infertile, Namibia is rich in mineral deposits such as uranium, diamonds, gold and copper. It is for economic and strategic motivation that South Africa defied UNO authority over Naslibia and was not willing to grant her independence. South Africa and European companies continued to exploit and siphon Namibia's mineral wealth as the white settlers numbering 100,000 controlled the other resources.

South Africa also continued to control Namibia for strategic reasons. Granted independence to Namibia meant granting independence to South Africa, a road the apartheid regime was not willing to take.

For economic and strategic reasons, South Africa was willing to do anything, including losing life, to maintain her grip over Namibia and this delayed independence.

The existence of white settlers in Namibia made it difficult for Namibia to attain early independence. In 1970, white settlers numbered 100,000 out of a total population of about 1,000,000 people in Namibia. But because of apartheid, the settlers controlled about 60 percent of land, controlled agriculture and mineral resources and lived in the urban areas. They regarded themselves as citizens of Namibia, since they had been born there. The settlers did not only join the South African forces in suppressing blacks, but also used their economic muscle to sustain South Africa's occupation of Namibia. This worked to hinder Namibia's attainment of early independence.

The weakness of the United Nations Organisation hampered the early realisation of Namibia's independence. Through its trusteeship council, the UNO had the duty to decolonise African nations. The UNO did little to punish South Africa for failure to respect a Security Council resolution revoking her (South Africa) control over Namibia in 1966. Even when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that South African occupation of Namibia was illegal, the UNO failed to force South Africa out of Namibia.

The UNO also turned into a spectator when western and African nations violated its economic and military embargo on the apartheid regime. This reluctance to take action against South Africa manifested weakness on the part of the United Nations, which denied the people of Namibia early independence.

The long survival of the cold war also hampered Namibia's effort to attain quick independence. The cold war hijacked Namibia's struggle for independence and turned it into an opportunity for the cold war enemies to fight their ideological warfare.

South Africa buttressed its military in Namibia by soliciting support from America in the guise of fighting communism. This strengthened South Africa and divided liberation efforts as SWAPO got support from the communist bloc, while SWANU got help from the capitalist bloc. Instead of fighting South Africa, the liberation movements in Namibia spent time antagonising one another because of difference in ideology.

The delayed independence of Namibia's neighbours meant delayed independence for her as well. Angola and Mozambique got independence in 1975, Zimbabwe iu 1980 and South Africa in 1994. Since Namibia's neighbours were also going through a difficult period of decolonisation, they could not support and give her bases to train fighters.

It was not until Angola got independence in 1975 that SWAPO conducted significant incursions against the occupying forces. - The brutality and terror visited upon the people of Namibia by the South African Police delayed independence in Namibia. South Africa resorted to desperate measures to break resistance in Namibia. Entire villages were razed, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure were destroyed and South Africa rained a hailstorm of bombs across Namibia. Peaceful agitations were greeted with repression, arrests, detention, torture and assassinations. Such oppression and suppression pushed the struggle underground, eliminated its leadership and scared the population from supporting it.

The weakness of the Organisation of African Unity contributed to the delayed independence of Namibia. Though the Liberation Committee was founded in 1964, the OAU had the responsibility to help Namibia decolonise. In spite of all its efforts to achieve this objective, the OAU had many weaknesses, which made her ineffective.

Its member states like Zambia and Malawi violated its sanctions by trading with South Africa; it lacked adequate resources to fund SWAPO and above all it lacked a standing army to confront the defiant and strong apartheid regime.

The OAU was also divided on strategy to liberate Namibia as Nigeria, Tanzania and Mozambique favoured a military approach, while Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, Gabon and Ivory Coast, etc wanted dialogue.

The apartheid regime of South Africa exploited the absence of a strong continental body in Africa, to tighten its grip on Namibia until 1990.

The presence of Cuban force* in Angola made early independence for Namibia a bleak hope. A 20,000 force of Cuban troops lived in Angola and supported MPLA against the South African backed UNITA in the Angolan civil war. The Cuban troops also supported SWAPO and ANC against the apartheid regime. South Africa suspected the future intentions of Cuban forces and gave a condition of Cuban forces withdrawing from Angola for her to grant independence to Namibia. It was not until Cuban troops withdrew from Angola that Namibia became independent.

During German and South African occupation, the black people of Namibia were deprived of economic resource and could not therefore achieve independence earlier than 199O. Since the fertile lands and mineral resources of Namibia were in the control of white settlers, the blacks could not earn a living by cultivation. Many became migrant workers inside South Africa, while those who remained suffered abject poverty. Due to poverty, the blacks who composed 90 percent of the total population of Namibia could not support the struggle for independence. This hampered early independence for Namibia.

The establishment of liberation bases in neighbouring countries hindered the smooth progress of the struggle, further delaying Namibia's independence. Since fighting for independence from within Namibia became difficult, PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO established training and guerrilla bases in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

It is from such bases that SWAPO launched attacks on South African occupying forces. However, because such bases were far, SWAPO incursions against South African forces were less effective. There was therefore, need to reduce the hitting range if South African forces were to suffer damage and defeat.