Kwame Nkrumah practised political dictator-ship and had unrealistic economic policies, especially from I960 onwards, and of the drastic fall in cocoa prices which also played a major role in undermining Ghana's progress. At this point it is necessary to examine the military factors - the discontent felt among Ghana's soldiers - which led to the military coup.

There is much evidence that Ghana's soldiers shared the general nation-wide discontent with Nkrumah's tyranny and growing incompetence. The soldiers, as much as the civilians, were disgusted and alarmed at the Osagyefo's dramatic change in character from a selfless and humble leader to a corrupt, proud, intolerant and power-drunk megalomaniac. But it would be naive to assume that the Ghanaian army struck against Nkrumah's regime purely out of national interest. One of the coup-makers, Afrifa declared;

'The aim of the unconstitutional military action we took is to regain - freedom and to create the conditions and atmosphere in which true democracy can thrive.'

On the other hand, Ruth First has averred that

'The Ghanaian army struck largely if not entirely to protect itself from the President's Own Guard regiment.4

Presumably the truth lies somewhere between these two diametrically opposed notions of national interest and self-interest. The fact that after the coup the military rulers made early arrangements for a return to civilian rule would seem to indicate that national interest was uppermost in the minds of the soldiers who took over on 24 February 1966.

What were the military and professional grievances that provided a contributory factor in their decision to carry out a coup? The President's Own Guard Company was being steadily expanded and being well equipped. In contrast the rest of the army suffered from a lack of new boots and uniforms and serviceable weapons and vehicles.

Only 40 per cent of the army's vehicles were road-worthy by 1966. And yet Nkrumah was talking bombastically of sending this army to Rhodesia to fight the white settlers after Ian Smith' s illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. At the same time political interference undermined the morale of the army. A CPP branch was opened in the military academy and cadets were obliged to apply to join it, through the Minister of Defence. There were also plans afoot to attach political officers to each unit, Russian-style.

In August 1965 Nkrumah had decreed the forced retirement of Major-General Otu, then Chief of Staff, and Lt-General Ankrah, his deputy. These professionally competent "'soldiers made way for the appointment to Chief of Staff and promotion to Major-General of Charles Barwah, essentially a political officer and a Nkrumaist socialist.

The police force was also demoralized by political interference. It was disarmed, eight senior officers were dismissed and two were detained after an assassination attempt on Nkrumah by a policeman in January 1964. The most senior police officer, Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley, and his deputy. A.K. Deku, became linked with secret plans for a coup being hatched by army Colonel Kotoka, commander of the Second Infantry Brigade group quartered in Kumasi. Kotoka was a popular and able officer, with drive and talent. As well as co-ordinating plans with Harlley, Kotoka recruited Major Akwasi Afrifa, commander of the Tamale garrison, and Colonel Ocran, commander of the Accra garrison.

The coup was planned to be carried out on a convenient occasion when Nkrumah was in the Far East on a Commonwealth Peace Mission to Vietnam. When the coup took place Nkrumah was actually in Rangoon, Burma. On 23 February the Tamale garrison drove south to join Kotoka's near Kumasi.

Then, under cover of a mobilization exercise to test the army's readiness to fight in Rhodesia, Afrifa's and Kotoka's forces made for Accra. In the early morning of 24 February the coup forces attacked Presidential Guard units in Flagstaff House and at a depot outside Accra, and seized vital centres of power, including the radio station: There was little resistance though Barwah was killed in the fighting.

Major General Ankrah took over power from Kwame Nkrumah

The police arrested most of Nkrumah's ministers by 6 a.m. and spent the next few days rounding up MPs, Regional Commissioners and CPP officials, Six hundred or so of Nkrumah's detainees emerged from prison; six hundred other detainees went in instead. The myth surrounding Nkrumah had been broken.

After the coup a National Liberation Council was set up with General Ankrah at its head and other army officers and policemen as members. The CPP was dissolved. The coup was greeted with spontaneous mass rejoicing throughout the country.