NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND THE NEW STATES IN AFRICA
Preface
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN NATIONALISM
CHAPTER 2: THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON AFRICA
CHAPTER FOUR:THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION
CHAPTER FIVE:THE GHANAIAN REVOLUTION
CHAPTER SIX:THE DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA: UNITY OR BALKANIZATION
CHAPTER SEVEN:PAN AFRICANISM
CHAPTER NINE:NEO-COLONIALISM
CHAPTER TEN:AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE REGAINING OF INDEPENDENCE
CHAPTER ELEVEN:NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA
CHAPTER TWELVE: NATIONALISM IN CONGO
CHAPTER THIRTEEN:NATIONALISM IN TANGANYIKA
CHAPTER FOURTEEN:NATIONALISM IN KENYA: THE DEFEAT OF REGIONALISM
CHAPTER FIFTEEN:MAU- MAU IN KENYA (1952-1956)
CHAPTER SIXTEEN:THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN:THE ARMED STRUGGLE: THE 1960S AND 1970S
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE
CHAPTER NINETEEN:THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN ZIMBABWE
CHAPTER TWENTY:THE POLISARIO WAR IN WESTERN SAHARA
CHAPTER TWENTY ONE:THE LIBERATION WAR IN NAMIBIA
CHAPTER TWENTY TWO:AFRIKANER AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
CHAPTER TWENTY THREE:NATIONALISM IN UGANDA
CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR:UGANDA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (UNLF) (1979-1980)
CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE:PROBLEMS OF DISUNITY: CIVIL WAR IN SUDAN
CHAPTER TWENTY SIX:THE ERITREAN SECESSION WAR FROM 1961-1993
CHAPTER TWENTY SIX:POLITICAL INSTABILITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.
CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN:SECESSIONISM IN ZAIRE, 1960-
CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT:THE NIGERIAN CIVIL/ SECESSION WAR, 1967-70
Introduction
Three States in One Country; Massive Electoral Rigging
Soldiers Overthrow Politicians; The Tactless Rule of Maj-Gen. Ironsi
Northerners Kill Ironsi & Tribal Genocide Follows
The Biafran Civil War; One Million People Die
Causes of the Biafran secession
Steps taken by General Gowon
Why the Biafran war was prolonged.
Why the Federal forces won the Nigerian Civil War
Effects of the Biafran war.
CHAPTER TWENTY NINE:THE CIVIL WAR IN CHAD FROM 1965-1982
CHAPTER THIRTY:THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, 1975-6
CHAPTER THIRTY ONE:MOZAMBICAN CIVIL WAR 1977-1994
CHAPTER THIRTY TWO:THE RWANDA REVOLUTION- 1959-1994
CHAPTER THIRTY THREE:THE ZANZIBAR REVOLUTION OF 1964
CHAPTER THIRTY FOUR:MILITARY COUP D'ETATS
CHAPTER THIRTY FIVE:THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION- 1969
CHAPTER THIRTY SIX:THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
CHAPTER THIRTY SEVEN:MULTIPARTY SYSTEM
CHAPTER THIRTY EIGHT:NATIONAL UNITY AND SOCIALISM
CHAPTER THIRTY NINE:AFRICAN CULTURE
CHAPTER FOURTY:REGIONAL AFRICAN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTY ONE:POPULATION EXPLOSION IN AFRICA
CHAPTER FOURTY TWO:WARS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES
CHAPTER FOURTY THREE:NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)
CHAPTER FOURTY FOUR:MAJOR PROBLEMS OF AFRICA
CHAPTER FOURTY FIVE:THE BEST TECHNIQUES TO PASSING A' LEVEL HISTORY PAPER 1
REFERENCES

Upon his assumption of power in July 1966 Major-General Gowon ordered the release of the political leaders of the Yoruba and minorities, including Awolowo, who had been jailed by the first republic and maintained there by the Ironsi government.

 

He also rescinded Ironsi's decree No. 34, which unified administrative services, and returned to a federal form of government.

 

In addition he called for consultative conferences of constitutional review in all the regions to precede an ad hoc conference on constitutional proposals to be held in September in Lagos.

 

Gowon's assumption of power did not quell fears in the North and tension between Ibo and Hausa continued to mount. The result was a significant number of isolated killings and mutilations of Ibo in early September which set off a stream of refugees into the East. Then followed, in cities such as Minna, what appeared to be organized killings of Ibo settlers.

 

The mutilated condition of the refugees arriving in the East inflamed Ibo public opinion and mobs attacked northern settlers in Port Harcourt and Onitsha. A train load of northern refugees was halted at the Imo river and many passengers were killed.

 

When this news reached the North the already explosive situation blew up in a wave of murder, looting and arson directed against Ibo settler communities. It seems clear that the military governor of the East, Odumegwu Ojukwu, neither encouraged nor connived at the acts of Ibo violence nor that Gowon or Hassan Katsina (military Governor in the North) were anything but horrified by what took place.

 

The pogroms, which sought to drive the Ibos out of the North and Hausas out of the East, swept over the cities of Makurdi, Gboko, Zaria, Gombe, Sokoto and Kaduna. In some cases combined teams of civilians and soldiers operated together. The climax came when a section or the army in Kano mutinied and a most terrifying civilian massacre took place, Hassan Katsina gravely went to confront his mutinous troops.

 

Yet some high-placed leaders in the North appear to have planned and encouraged this carnage. Gowon admitted his own suspicions: 'I think there are a few among us who just do not want to see anything good happening in this country and they are fanning up some of these ignorant people to do some atrocious things.' It has been estimated that the pogrom killed between 10 000 and 30 000 people.

GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON defeated the secessionists and formed a central federal government. He was also toppled by his junior officers; went into exile and gained a doctorate degree.

 

It continued until all Ibos had fled from the North and all Hausa from the East. Many northern individuals went all out to save the Ibo population and help to evacuate them to safety, but this did little to diminish the terrible persecution which the Ibo people suffered.

 

Hardly a family was without its personal tragedy- Ibos felt that they were not safe anywhere near northern soldiers and the entry routes to the East were jammed with an estimated two million refugees from the North, the West and Lagos. Whatever else may, in future, be discovered to have caused 'Biafra', the effect of the pogrom upon the Ibo would appear to be the main factor.

 

The East pulled Out of the ad hoc conference in Lagos and demanded sovereign existence for the regions linked by common services. Ojukwu refused to attend a meeting of the (Supreme Military Council, claiming fears for his personal safety. Through the good offices of Ghana, a meeting of the Council was convened in Aburi in early January 1967. This resulted in decree No. 8 of 17 March in which Gowon gave enormous powers to the Eastern Region in a generous attempt to conciliate the Ibos and prevent their secession.

 

However, Ojukwu replied with an edict which converted all federal institutions in the East into a regional treasury. Gowon's further attempts at conciliation were met by actions that indicated Ojukwu had perhaps already seriously decided on secession. For example, Ojukwu seized the federal mail vans sent to carry mail into the East. A Nigerian Airways plane sent to reopen air services was also seized in Port Harcourt. These were directly provocative acts of the eastern government.

 

It is now obvious that the East had determined on secession although it is not clear at what point secession had become the official policy of the eastern military governor. In May a National Conciliation Committee which included Chief Awolowo met Ojukwu in a vain bid to dissuade him from secession. Gowon accepted some of the Committee's proposals but Ojukwu refused to reciprocate.

 

In late May 1967 Major-General Gowon decreed the division of Nigeria into 12 states and the formation of a council which would include civilians - to be called commissioners - who would be in charge of various government departments. This was designed to rally the minority ethnic groups to the support of the federal government and was carrying out the aims of the mutineers of January 1966, of relieving the fears of the minorities and strengthening the federal government. It was also the policy for which many Ibo had been the longest and most ardent advocates.

 

The enthusiasm for states, however, had cooled among the ruling group in the East with the discovery and development of the petroleum resources of their own minority areas. It was these resources which made secession an economic possibility, while the 12-state structure left only 50 to 40 per cent of the' petroleum resources in Ibo hands. Thus the 12-states decree was interpreted in the East as a plan to take away oil wealth from the Ibo.

Soldierrs well armed to defend Biafra during the secession war.

LT. COL. OJUKWU declaring the infamous secession of Biafra.

 

The creation of states has often been interpreted as an anti-Ibo move, but it hit the North and particular the Hausa-Fulani harder than any other group. Certainly the Tiv, Kanuri, Northern Yoruba and Nupe were pleased but the Hausa-Fulani were divided into three states, and the northern regional capital city of Kaduna had to be broken up. None of the northern states was economically strong enough to maintain single-handedly numerous former regional institutions, such as Ahmadu Bello University. In no other part: of the country did the new states cause such dislocation.

In any case Gowon was appealing to the minorities of the North as much as to the minorities of the East. The composition of the new council reflected the new political realities, with 7 of its 15 members from the minorities, including Joseph Tarka (Tiv) and Anthony Enahoro (Ishan) and five Yoruba including Chief Awolowo. In appointing the new states Governors, Gowon confirmed Ojukwu as Governor of the Ibo or East-Central State. The creation of states was uniformly welcomed except among the Ibo and a large section among the Hausa.

 

On 30 May 1967 Odumegwu Ojukwu solemnly proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. 'Biafra' was the response of a people who were convinced that the pogrom had been an "attempt at genocide, that no Nigerian leader, no matter how well-disposed, could guarantee their security within Nigeria, and that the 12-state structure was an attempt to , lay hands on their' oil resources. In addition, their leaders were being encouraged by the ( promises of foreign nations and foreign firms; and hopes of being able to turn foreign sympathy to open support proved misleading.

 

Against the emotion of 'Biafra' stood the intellectual ideal of one Nigeria. The potential of Nigeria's rich economic base and vast multi-ethnic population for the creation of a great and powerful African state was a dream - as yet unfulfilled but never far from the thinking of most of Nigeria's Western-educated elite.

 

Fighting in the Nigerian Civil War (or Biafran War) began on 6 July 1967 when a Federal offensive into the Eastern Region began. The First Division of the Nigerian Army under Colonel Muhammad Shuwa captured Ogoja on 10 July and Nsukka on 15 July. The Third Marine Commandos Division under Colonel Benjamin Adekunle soon to be nicknamed 'the Scorpion' captured the vital oil port of Bonny on 25 July. Adekunle was a thoroughly integrated Nigerian: his father was a Yoruba-speaker, his mother was from the North and his wife was an Easterner.

 

The Biafrans countered the initial Federal advance with a dramatic offensive of their own. They planned to topple the Mid-Wen government and in a lightning strike capture Ibadan, unprotected since the recent withdrawal of northern troops, and Lagos, the Federal capital. On 9 August the military government of the Mid-West state in Benin was overthrown by Ibo elements within its own battalion. This action was co-ordinated with an invasion from across the Niger under a Yoruba officer, Victor Banjo. The Biafrans then penetrated as far as the small town of Ore in Western Region where a fierce battle took place on 29 August, the town changing hands several times. In the end Colonel Murtala Muhammed, in command of the newly formed Second Division, drove the Biafrans out of Ore and back into retreat to the Mid-West. Lagos had been saved. The result of the Battle of Ore strengthened the resolve of the people of Western Region to stay within the federation and to win the war in partnership with the rest of Federal Nigeria.

 

Murtala followed up his victory at Ore by recapturing Benin on 14 September and Asaba on 9 October. Meanwhile Shuwa had taken Enugu on 4 October. The second Federal offensive continued successfully when Adekunle captured Calabar in a combined naval and military operation on 18 October; he then occupied the Calabar hinterland, linking up with the Federal troops at Ikom to cut off Biafra from the Cameroons. The Federal advance was temporarily halted in January 1968 when Murtala made an abortive attempt to capture Onitsha from Asaba on the opposite bank of the Niger. Onitsha was strongly defended by the tough disciplinarian and dogged Biafran fighter Colonel Hannibal Achuzia.

 

However, Murtala managed to move up the Niger, cross it at Idah, and advance down the east bank on Onitsha, which he eventually captured on 21 March. In April Shuwa took Abakaliki and Afikpo and Adekunle liberated the entire South-Eastern State. Adekunle captured the Bonny oil field on 6 May and Port Harcourt on 19 May, thus completely scaling off Biafra from the sea. The Biafrans were now enclosed within the heart of Iboland, and 11 of Nigeria's 12 states were now able to function within the Federal framework.

 

Nigerian military strategy from the beginning of the war had been to occupy the minority non-Ibo areas in the East but not, if it could be avoided, penetrate into the heart of Iboland, in the hope that peace talks and negotiations would lead to a repudiation of Ojukwu and other secessionist leaders and make military operations in central Iboland unnecessary.

 

Almost continuous secret negotiations had taken place between the Federal representatives and certain Ibo groups, in Enugu, Onitsha, Lagos and overseas- Peace talks with Qjukwu's government held in Kampala, Uganda, in May 1968 failed because Ojukwu was not prepared to make any meaningful concessions, probably because Biafra had been recognized by a number of African states. Ojukwu's refusal to surrender for another year and a half left the Federal army no option but to fight its way inch by inch into the heart of Ibo country.

The final stage of the war, from mid-1968 to 1970, was marked by very determined Biafran resistance and increasing malnutrition and starvation among the civilian population- There was heavy fighting at Oguta and Owerri. Adekunle took Oguta on 10 and 11 September along with Uli airstrip, Biafra's last major link with the outside world. The Biafrans retook Oguta on 15 September. Adekunle took Owerri on 16 September and held off a Biafran offensive to recapture the town and Aba from 21 to 24 December, However, Biafra recaptured Owerri on 22 April 1969.

 

In May 1969 a major reshuffle of Nigeria's army commanders led to Adekunle's replacement by Colonel Obasanjo. On 27 December the Third Division linked up with the First Division at Umuahia, and on 7 January 1970 Obasanjo captured Owerri. On 11 January Ojukwu flew to the Ivory Coast, one of the states that had recognized his secession. On 12 January Obasanjo retook Uli airstrip and the remnants of the Biafran army surrendered.

GEN. MURTALA MUHAMMED a Senior Federal government soldier who fought so hard to save Nigeria from Secession

 

The Ibo had given almost local support to Biafra, whose long resistance was due partly to their fear of genocide by the Federal army, a fear reinforced by heavy Federal air raids that did not concentrate on military targets until the last months of the war. The long war led to far more deaths among civilians than had occurred in the 1966 massacres in the North. Ojukwu had gravely miscalculated if he assumed in 1967 that secession would save Ibo lives.

National Movements and New States in Africa