For any understanding of the causes of the first Nigerian army coup it is necessary to study not only the whole course of events from independence on 1 October I960 to 15 January 1966, but also the general trends in Nigerian politics in the decolonization period of the 1950s.

We have seen how British colonial officials, when supervising constitutional progress in Nigeria, entrenched regionalism and ethnicism in successive constitutions but with the general support of the Nigerian nationalist politicians. In practice three ethnic sub-nationalisms emerged:

Yoruba nationalism in the West,
Ibo nationalism in the East and
Hausa-Fulani nationalism in the North.
British motives for confirming a three-region federal system as the basis of the new Nigerian state were two-fold:

1. to protect the less developed Northern emirates from the more educationally developed southern peoples; and,

2. by creating a number of sub-centres of power, to avert the danger of absolute government.

Institutionalized ethnic pluralism would, it was believed, strengthen political competitiveness and Western-style multi-party parliamentary institutions. Thus ethnic pluralism in Nigerian politics was a legacy of the colonial period. Already by 1952 there was a Yoruba-dominated Action Group (AG) government in the West, an Ibo- dominated NCNC government in the East and a Hausa-Fulani-dominated NPC government in the North.

The trouble with ethnic pluralism is that it is favourable not only to parliamentary institutions but also to violence among the various groups. Ethnic pluralism in much of' Africa is among the most politically sensitive of all social issues. The risk of violence among ethnic groups is at the centre of Africa's twin crises of identity and integration. Britain's policy of indirect rule as a form of colonial administration tended to sharpen ethnic loyalty precisely in those places where the policy was most successful. To that extent it probably increased the risk of violence among ethnic communities.

At the same time, however, this indirect rule created the framework for genuinely competitive politics and for a spirit of energetic dissent that lasted for at least a few years after independence.

Nigeria provided a most dramatic example of the two related consequences of indirect rule. The country started off with an almost furious liberal ethos in its national politics, with all the wrangles of strong, rival political parties, all the excitement of dissent, and all the babble of competitive political journalism. Yet the tragedy of the civil war was another consequence of indirect rule. By institutionalizing ethnic pluralism in Nigeria, the British created not only the potential for a competitive democracy but also the framework for latent violence. Nigeria reaped both harvests, as did Uganda with its own tradition of Lugardism.

Regional politics in central government from 1954 to 1966 consisted of rivalry among the southern parties to win a political alliance with the Northern People's Congress and thus share in the spoils of Federal Government. Such an alliance was felt to be necessary after the 1958 constitutional conference arranged for the Federal Assembly to be elected on the basis of population figures, and the North, with over half of Nigeria's people, was hence guaranteed political domination of the country.

An alliance of this kind, however, would be a matter of expediency and self-interest for most of the politicians involved, rather than a matter of principle, i.e. of ethnic partnership in a wider national interest.

At independence Nigeria was governed by an NPC-NCNC alliance, with Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) as Governor-General and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC) as federal Prime Minister. Balewa, however, as the leading representative of northern talakawa (commoner) interests was less influential in the NPC than the aristocratic Prime Minister of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of sokoto. Bello's domination of the NPC and of Balewa was to prove to be a crucial factor in the deterioration of Nigeria's political life and in the immediate background to the military coup.

The leader of the federal opposition was the leader of the Action Group, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. In the 1959 federal elections Awolowo had sought to rearrange the ethnic pattern of federal politics by seeking the support of the ethnic minorities in the East and the North for the Action Group. For this he had to woo them away from the NCNC and NPC.

As an act of political revenge the Federal Government in April 1961 pushed through a motion to create a Mid-West state around Benin out of the non-Yoruba minorities of the Western Region. This vindictiveness was carried further when in 1962 Awolowo and many of his principal lieutenants were arrested and Jailed on doubtful charges of conspiracy, and a government commission of inquiry was set up to probe the financial affairs of Action Group politicians (but not politicians of the governing coalition).

The response of a group of Yoruba politicians under the Action Group's former deputy-leader Chief Samuel Akintola to this intimidation was to break away from the AG and form a new party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), with the object of allying with the dominant NPC in Federal Government in order to foster Yoruba interests. Akintola's plan was backed by the conservative Sardauna who wanted to drop his difficult (liberal) ally the NCNC and join up instead with the new NNDP. Balewa, however, preferred an all-embracing three-regions alliance at federal level in order to reduce ethnic tensions. The NNDP quickly emerged as the opposition to the AG and the NCNC in the West; Akintola won control of the Western House of Assembly through defections from the other parties, aided by pressure from the Federal Government, and became Prime Minister of a minority regional government in Ibadan.

Then came the announcement in February 1964 of the results of the Federal census held in 1962); over half of Nigeria's total population of ‘55 million' lived in the North. The NCNC had hoped the South would 'win the census' and thus take over the Federal Government after adjustment of constituencies; the preliminary returns had indicated a southern majority. Instead the census results confirmed the northern domination of the Federal House of Assembly.

The NCNC governments of the East and Mid-West rejected the census, out of chagrin rather than a sense of being cheated, because there is clear evidence of gross irregularities and inflated figures in all regions. The census results led to a major realignment in Nigerian politics. In readiness for the federal election of 1964-5 the NCNC allied with the Action Group and the small opposition parties of the North to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This group was opposed by the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), composed of the NPC and the NNDP.

The federal election of 1964-5 has become notorious for its electoral malpractice. All parties indulged in questionable practices like violence and rigging in an effort to ensure the election of their candidates. The result was technically an overall victory for the NNA, but it was affected by an UPGA boycott in many constituencies, and was considered to be so dubious by many, for other reasons, that President Azikiwe refused to invite the NNA to form a government.

Balewa, always a peace-maker and seeker of compromise, produced a plan to form a national government of all parties including UPGA, and Azikiwe gave him his support in the interests of national unity. However, by this time inter-regional trust and understanding had reached very low ebb and both Balewa and Azikiwe earned the opprobrium of their respective supporters for forming a national government.

Political violence and unrest, especially in the West, became even more serious during the western regional election of 1965. This election was reduced to a physical battle between the opposing NNDP and UPGA groups. Most of the Yoruba rejected Akintola in sympathy with the imprisoned Awolowo and because of lower cocoa prices and a falling standard of living; the NNDP feared a clear UPGA victory in a democratic ballot and rigged the elections. Both sides claimed victory. The official figures showed the UPGA had won only 15 out of 88 seats, but Akintola's government and administration had collapsed in the face of popular disorder in the West.

Regional discontent had also erupted in violence among the Tiv people in the Middle Belt in the North. Joseph Tarka's mainly Tiv-supported United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) won landslide victories in many Middle Belt constituencies in alliance with the Action Group in the federal election of 1959. The ruling NPC used its control of Northern Region ministries and of the Native Authorities to cut off the Tiv from various amenities and to bring trumped-up charges against UMBC representatives and officials. In I960 the Tiv rose up in revolt in mass arson attacks on NPC offices and the homes of NPC officials and supporters, The Nigerian army had to be used to restore law and order in Tiv country both in I960 and when serious rioting broke our again in 1964.

Ethnic conflict took another form in the competition for employment and promotion. In 1965 there was nearly a mutiny in the federal civil service in Lagos when northerners were promoted. In the same year there was a customs service strike when preference was given in promotion to five northerners; the strike was seeded only by the parallel promotion of five southerners. Urban unemployment in the South had reached almost 30 per cent by the early 1960s and generated much Ibo-Yoruba rivalry in Lagos. But Ibo-Yoruba job competition was felt acutely even at the higher levels of the elite, especially in the matter of university vice chancellorships. There was a non-violent but unseemly and ungentlemanly row when the Yoruba-dominated Council of the University of-Lagos replaced an Ibo, Dr Eni Njoki, with a Yoruba, S.B. Biobaku, who had already agreed to become Vice-ChancelIor of the University of Zambia. Ibo-Yoruba tension was also strong at the University of Ibadan where ethnic factions were formed among the academic staff and both social relations and academic co-operation deteriorated. Thus Nigerian academics as well as politicians had failed, by the middle of the 1960s, to produce or practise an ideology of national unity which transcended ethnicism or communalism.

We shall see that some elements of the Nigerian army were anxious to sweep away ethnicism in Nigerian government, while other elements were ready to act as instruments of ethnicism. However, the soldiers were generally united in 1966 on the need to root out the major evil in Nigerian politics: financial corruption. The politicians of each region tended to entrench themselves, from 1954, by acquiring economic interests. Regional marketing boards and development corporations provided the funds for the ruling party to dispense patronage and manipulate government revenues for its own advantage and the economic self-interest of its leaders.

The northern politicians were slower than the southern leaders to manipulate politics in this way; after all, the North already had its centuries-old traditional sources of wealth and patronage. However, the investigations into the northern spoils system after the January coup revealed that the northern aristocracy was beginning to catch up with the southern elite in its use of government resources to secure large farms, contracting businesses and real estate. The biggest borrowers of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation were the big politicians of the Northern People's Congress.

The Nigerian workers’ general strike in June 1964 was more than a campaign to win higher wages. It was also a system of popular urban discontent with the politicians and the political system, of widespread resentment at the arrogance, corruption and conspicuous. A consumption of the politicians and of their obsession with ethnic competition. However, the Nigerian urban working class was politically unorganized and far too small to consider challenging the corrupt regime in Lagos.

An effective challenge to the politicians could, given the objective conditions of Nigerian society in 1966, come only from the soldiers. The Nigerian army at independence consisted of only five battalions and certain supporting units organized into two brigades. The army was much less affected than were politicians with ethnic disputes, probably because certain standards of military professionalism were maintained and these standards overrode ethnicism. However, ethnic tensions were present in the army. For example, in the political crisis after the 1964-5 federal election, a group of lieutenant colonels of Ibo origin, including Ojukwu, offered army intervention on the side of President Azikiwe and the UPGA against the NNA. On the other side of politics, the Fourth Battalion was used as an extension of the Akintola administration in Ibadan, with the duties of protecting NNDP politicians and the western House of Assembly from the wrath of UPGA supporters. The army was thus politicized before 1966. Nor should its experience in the UN operations in the Congo (1960-4) be overlooked. But ethnic awareness in the army was also aroused by the issues of recruitment and promotion. At independence southern officers outnumbered northern officers by about five to one a reflection of disparity in education between North and South.

Northerners formed 75 per cent of the lower ranks, but these were mainly from the Middle Belt or Borno not the Hausa-Fulani heartland. A quota system was introduced for lower ranks in 1958 and for officers in 1961, on the basis of 50 per cent for the North 25 per cent for the West and 25 per cent for the East.

As a result, by 1965 a much higher proportion of officers were northerners. Efforts were also made to correct the imbalance between junior and senior officer appointments and as a result some northerners of shorter service and experience were promoted over the heads of southern Junior officers, especially those of Ibo origin who were numerous. This made worse the promotion jam that already existed for southern Junior officers, because most senior officers were relatively young men.

Another source of grievance for southern junior officers was the fact that they were far better educated than most senior officers who had risen through the ranks, for example men like Major-General Ironsi, who had started his army career as a private. The promotion bottleneck seems to have been a significant factor though not the only one that motivated the southern junior officers who initiated the coup in January 1966.

In conclusion, which factor was predominant in leading to the take-over of Nigeria's government by the army? The January coup can be interpreted as an attempt by southern officers to defend the South against political domination from the North. By the time of the coup northern political strategy (the aims of the Sardauna) had become infiltration of the South, in contrast to the earlier northern strategy of isolation from the South. Under the Sardauna the NPC after independence saw the interest of the North in consolidating its federal power.

This northern attempt to dominate federal and southern politics was perhaps the most significant integrative event in Nigeria's history. Ethnicism and regionalism in Nigeria did indeed become worse than ever. Yet, by a curious paradox, the nation-wide participation in politics, or the nationalization of politics, had been taking place at the same time. There was even a danger of an imposed unitarism as the NPC-NNDP alliance sought by questionable practices to dominate the political life of the country at federal and regional levels. Balewa’s regime achieved a dramatic feat of national integration in making this danger conceivable.

Yet, it was in part precisely that feat which precipitated the events that led to the army coup of January. In an important sense the crisis of Nigeria arose from the fact that politics had been integrating the country too rapidly. The new northern desire for hegemony in the South was in national terms, a significant improvement over the old northern isolationism. But the nationalization of politics in Nigeria was growing faster than the country's capacity for compromise. Politics were penetrating to every part of the nation before techniques of conflict-resolution between competing groups were adequately developed.