Introduction
In
the 1940s the people of Buganda took the lead in African nationalist
politics in Uganda. Their motives were political and economic. The
Baganda desired greater participation, by the appointment of more
representatives in Buganda's local parliament, the Lukiko. They hoped
for the replacement of the old type of chiefs. These political demands
led to riots in 1945 and the assassination of the Katikiro (Prime
Minister) of Buganda, Martin Nsibirwa.
The demand of the Baganda for the right to market their own crops led
to riots in 1949 against Asian and European businessmen. The riots of
1945 and 1949 were spontaneous outbursts by sections of the African
population of Uganda which desired political democracy and economic
freedom. The riots were carried out by Baganda but they did not
represent overt Baganda sub-nationalist or ethnic nationalist feeling.
It was not until the elite took over the nationalist movement in the
1950s that ethnic sub-nationalism came to the fore both in Buganda and
in the other areas of Uganda. Paradoxically, it was the attempt by
Britain to weaken Bagandan separatism and create a unitary system of
government for all Uganda that provoked a strong outbreak of Baganda
ethnic expression in the political life of the country.
In 1952 the British Government appointed as Governor of Uganda the
brilliant and comparatively young 42-year-old Sir Andrew Cohen,
formerly head of the Africa Department of the Colonial Office. Almost
as soon as he arrived in Uganda, Cohen proposed radical changes based
on a strongly centralized system of administration and representative
(elected) government. Cohen believed that the future of Uganda must lie
in a unitary form of central Government on parliamentary lines covering
the whole country. . . .The Protectorate is too small to grow into a
series of separate units of government, even if these are federated
together.' Cohen looked forward to development of the country 'by a
central Government of the Protectorate as a whole with no part of the
country dominating any other part but all working together for the good
of the whole Protectorate and the progress of its people'8
In 1953 Cohen introduced changes in the Legislative Council. The number
of representatives was increased to 28, of whom 14 were to be Africans.
In 1955 a ministerial system was introduced, but before then the
"Kabaka crisis', as the British called it, had shaken the country. In
1953 the Kabaka, (Sir Edward) Mutesa II, supported, by the Lukiko, came
out in open opposition to British government policy. The confrontation
was, in part, connected with questions of Buganda's autonomy in
relation to the British, and also Uganda's autonomy in relation to
Kenya settlers.
The precipitating factor had been a speech by the Colonial Secretary
which seemed to suggest the formation of an East African Federation
which, in the circumstances of the day, would have meant greater
settler say in Ugandan affairs. Buganda reacted sharply to this speech,
and before long there was a fusion between the issue of Buganda's
rights as against the Governor, and Uganda's rights as against white
settler dreams of an East African Federation.
In November 1953 Cohen deposed Mutesa and deported him to Britain in an
aeroplane, for 'breaking' the Buganda Agreement of 1900 which required
the Kabaka to co-operate loyally with the Protectorate Government. His
deportation turned Mutesa into a nationalist hero. In the words of
Ssemakula Kiwanuka, 'Overnight, Mutesa became a hero and acquired a
measure of popularity which he had not achieved since his accession in
1940'. 9
Mutesa returned in November 1955, and signed with Cohen a new Buganda
Agreement based on the 1954 Namirembe Conferences. The agreement was a
compromise. Unitarism was confirmed, but the Kabaka secured three vital
concessions: securer rule for himself vis-a-vis a reformed Lukiko; new
machinery for resolving disputes between the Buganda and Uganda
governments: and safeguards against settler domination of an East
African Federation.
Cohenist unitarism triumphed but the Baganda and their leaders were not
converted to it. The return of the Kabaka and the new agreement were
seen by the Baganda not as reconciliation with the British but as a
victory over them. This attitude on the part of the majority of the
Baganda was to make the evolution of a united nationalist movement in
Uganda almost an impossibility.
National Movements and New States in Africa