The failure of the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad,1981-2

President Goukouni had called in Libya to help him defeat his rival Habre, but a series of diplomatic miscalculations and failure to consolidate his rule in Chad brought about Goukouni's downfall and Habre's return to power. France's new President, Mitterand, was determined to detach Goukouni from Libya, and he offered the Chad leader financial aid and arms supplies- Mitterand also promised logistical support for an OAU peace- keeping force to replace the Libyans.

Goukouni, anxious to win popular favour and to assert his independence of Colonel Gadafi, agreed to accept French aid and an OAU presence in Chad. Goukouni asked the Libyans to leave Chad. However, he had not anticipated that Gadafi would withdraw his troops abruptly, which he did early in November 1981, before the arrival of the OAU forces. The interval allowed Habre and his 7000-strong FAN forces, operating both from Sudan and within Chad, and well-supplied by the United States, to consolidate their hold over the eastern part of the country.The OAU peace-keeping force of 3000 men, mainly from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, arrived in stages in late November and December. It was commanded by a Nigerian, Major-General Geoffrey Ejiga.
Goukouni had gambled on the OAU force defending him from Habre as the Libyans had done; the President had tried but failed (6 create a national army out of the private armies of the ten or more factions that comprised his GUNT (Government of National Unity). This gamble failed as from January to June 1982 Habre's FAN troops advanced steadily through the northern and central districts of the country without the OAU force attempting to stop them. Then in February at an OAU meeting in Nairobi of the 18 nations involved in the Chad Standing Committee, decisions were taken to work for a ceasefire in Chad, to be followed by all-party negotiations, the drafting of a new constitution and national elections. The OAU peace-keeping force was to be withdrawn by the end of June.
A young Idris Deby who later became President of Chad
 
The decision for the OAU to pull out of Chad was disappointing but logical, and the whole episode has revealed some valuable if harsh lessons. The OAU's members failed to h agree on what their peace-keeping force was trying to do. They vacillated between two options: keeping the two rival sides apart and stopping civil war; or giving full backing to the Goukouni government. As a result, the force's mandate remained unclear. In any case, the OAU, it was revealed, lacked the permanent machinery to control even such a modest operation as that in Chad.
There were far too few troops. The resources of African armies, even from Africa's leading military nation, Nigeria, did not prove to be up to the cask of keeping the peace-keeping detachments either in touch with each other and the outside world, or even adequately supplied. Finally, the OAU's members failed to come up with enough money.
The OAU costed the operation at f87 million a year, but in the first two months of the force's deployment ,in Chad, OAU member states provided less than .6270 000. Lack of financial support led to the early withdrawal of a third of the Nigerian contingent in May.
On 7 June 1982 Habre's FAN troops seized N'djamena and overthrew Goukouni'; government. Goukouni escaped and went into exile in Algeria. During the fighting for the capital the OAU force remained neutral, but its presence restricted the area of battle and casualties were very low. The OAU chairman, Kenya's President Moi, ordered the withdrawal of the OAU peace force on 11 June.

National Movements and New States in Africa